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Figure 10.1  Shin gōmanizumu sengen special: Yasukuniron [Neo-Gōmanism Mani- 
festo Special: On Yasukuni], p. 12.1 
!
Manga is an art that should warn of or actively attack all things in the world that 
are unjust, irrational, unnatural, or incongruous with the will of the nation. 
Katō Etsurō, Shin rinen manga no gihō 
[Techniques for a New Manga], 1942 
!
Yasukuni Shrine is the final stronghold in defence of the history, spirit, and culture 
of Japan. 
Kobayashi Yoshinori, Yasukuniron, 2005, 68 
!
In 1992, just as Japan’s economic bubble was in process of bursting, a series of 
manga began to appear in the weekly Japanese tabloid SPA! under the title Gōmanism 
sengen (Haughtiness or Insolence Manifesto). Authored by Kobayashi Yoshinori 
(b. 1953), this series blurs the line between manga and graphic novel2 to engage in 
forthright social and political commentary with an unabashedly (ultra-)nationalistic 
slant. Over the next decade and a half, Kobayashi and his works became a publishing 
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phenomenon.  As  of  2010,  there  were  over  30  volumes  of  Gōmanism  (and 
Neo-Gōmanism) manga, including several ‘special editions’ – such as the best- 
selling Shin gōmanizumu sengen special: Sensōron (Neo-Gōmanism Manifesto 
Special: On War, 1998) – that have caused controversy and even international criti- 
cism for their revisionist portrayal of modern Japanese history.3 At its most general, 
Neo-Gōmanism is a graphic ‘style’ marked by withering sarcasm and blustering 
anger at what is perceived as Japanese capitulation to the West and China on matters 
of foreign policy and the treatment of recent East Asian history. Its very success, 
however, warrants closer treatment. 
In 2005, Kobayashi published a graphic work entitled Shin gōmanizumu sengen 
special: Yasukuniron (Neo-Gōmanism Manifesto Special: On Yasukuni), which 
tackles the much-debated ‘problem’ of Yasukuni Shrine, the militaristic religious 
complex that has become a lightning-rod for debates regarding Japanese historical 
memory – especially with regard to the military expansionism in East Asia that 
led to the Asia-Pacific War (1931–45). Frequently overlooked in discussions of 
Yasukuni, however, are a number of complex issues related to its religious 
doctrines – in particular, the interpretation of Shinto presented at Yasukuni and 
the dominant ideology of Japan’s military era: ‘State Shinto’ (kokka Shintō). This 
essay examines the portrayal of the Yasukuni Issue within Yasukuniron, in order 
to: (a) flesh out the characteristics of Kobayashi’s Neo-Gōmanism in relation to 
the ‘theology’ of State Shinto; (b) examine the power and limits of manga as a 
representational form for teaching about the complex nexus of religion, politics 
and history in modern Japan; and (c) make the case that Yasukuni Shrine itself has 
long functioned as a form of ‘revisionist manga’ – and is thus the perfect subject 
for Kobayashi’s Neo-Gōmanist treatment. 
!
!
Yasukuni and the legacy of State Shinto: a brief overview4 
!
The shrine that would become Yasukuni was founded in 1869, a year following 
the Meiji Restoration, as a place for ‘pacifying’ the spirits of all those killed in 
wars fought for the ‘nation’.5  Originally known as Tokyo Shōkonsha (literally, 
Tokyo shrine for the invocation of the dead), the name was changed to Yasukuni 
Jinja in 1879 at the behest of the Meiji Emperor. As Kobayashi notes, Yasukuni 
was chosen to imply ‘pacify the nation’, and in a (State) Shinto context this was 
understood to mean that the primary if not sole purpose of this shrine was to 
pacify the spirits of the war dead, which would help bring tranquility (and protec- 
tion) to the national body (kokutai).6 Administered directly by the ministries of the 
Army and Navy, by the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Yasukuni 
had entered into popular consciousness as a symbol of Japanese imperial 
conquest and a focus for the state-sponsored cult of the war dead. Today, 
Yasukuni enshrines the ‘souls’ of 2.5 million people, including roughly 57,000 
women, 21,000 Koreans, 28,000 Taiwanese, at least three Britons and, most 
controversially by far, 14 individuals indicted as ‘Class A’ war ciminals.7 All of 
these men and women ‘offered their lives to the nation in the upheavals that 
brought forth the modern state’ between 1853 and the present. As such, according 
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to Kobayashi (and Yasukuni), those enshrined at Yasukuni are anything but ‘mere 
victims’ (tan naru giseisha). They are rather ‘martyrs’ (junnansha) ‘heroic spirits’ 
(eirei), and ‘(protective) gods of the nation’ (gokokushin). As we shall see, the 
intertwined tropes of martyrdom and victimhood play an important role in the 
attempt to ‘restore’ Yasukuni – and by extension, true Japanese ‘spirit’ and 
‘identity’. 
In contrast to the coverage of the various political issues raised by Yasukuni, the 
more specific religious or ‘theological’ elements are often overlooked in popular 
coverage as well as within scholarly analysis. Yasukuni is, after all, a ‘shrine’, and 
one that has played a central role in the formulation and expression of a particular 
religious ideology that is often known today as ‘State Shinto’ (kokka Shintō).8 
While there remains much debate over the precise meaning of State Shinto, there 
is general consensus that modern Shinto nationalism has roots in the so-called 
National Learning or Nativist School (kokugaku) of the mid- to late Edo period 
(1600–1867). While Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) is the most significant early 
figure in Shinto revivalism, it was his self-proclaimed successor, Hirata Atsutane 
(1776–1843), who transfigured nativist doctrine into a more ‘heroic’ and populist 
form, focused on loyalty, patriotism and attunement to the spirits of the dead.9 
Known as Hirata or Restoration Shinto (fukkō Shintō), Atsutane’s interpretation of 
Shinto nativism would come to serve as one of the primary doctrinal foundations 
for the State Shinto of Meiji, Taishō and early Shōwa.10 It is also important to note 
the influence of Confucian and Neo-confucian traditions, which had gained influ- 
ence in the Edo period as a source of ethical and sociopolitical reflection on the 
nation. Whereas ‘traditional’ Shinto provided to State Shinto a connection to the 
Japanese ancestral land, indigenous spirits and the symbolic power of the emperor, 
Confucianism, especially as interpreted via the Mito School, added a strong sense 
of moral righteousness, including the core virtues of loyalty (chū) and filial piety 
(kō) – transplaced in State Shinto from the head of the family to the head of the 
family-state (kokka), i.e., the emperor.11 
The basic ‘theology’ of State Shinto, at least in its later, wartime incarnation, 
might be summarised as follows: (a) all Japanese belong to a single national body 
(kokutai), whose ‘head’ is the emperor – not any specific person so much as the 
‘unbroken’ imperial line; (b) the Imperial House, by virtue of its lineal connection 
to the heavenly kami, as confirmed in the sacred classics, is sacrosanct and invio- 
lable; (c) all Japanese, by virtue of being members of the national body, owe their 
complete allegiance and filial piety to the emperor, a living kami; (d) by extension, 
all Japanese must obey the directives of the (imperial) state, even to the point of 
giving their lives for the kokutai.12 This is also the theological foundation of Yasu- 
kuni Shrine – albeit with a greater emphasis on the glories of self-sacrifice and 
martyrdom. As I will show in this essay, while Kobayashi’s manga revisioning13 
of Yasukuni also relies on this basic set of theological or ideological premises, 
Yasukuniron indicates a subtle but significant shift in focus away from the ancient 
period, the Imperial House and the state and towards a populist, modernist and 
possibly fascist rendering of ‘State Shinto’. In some ways, this might be read as a 
‘return’ to Atsutane’s vision of National Learning as largely a ‘cult of the dead’. 
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The Gōmanist ‘truth’ about the Yasukuni problem 
!
The title of the preface to Yasukuniron – ‘The Ignorance behind the Yasukuni 
Problem’ (‘Muchi ni yoru Yasukuni mondai’)14  – is pure Gōmanism. Here and 
throughout the manga Kobayashi asserts that the entire ‘problem’ of Yasukuni is 
based on a widespread (at times, it would seem, universal) ignorance of the various 
issues involved, an ignorance willfully perpetuated by national politicians and the 
mass media. However, the Truth is out there (or rather, in here, i.e., the pages of 
Yasukuniron), and possession of that Truth will set us all free from our blindness. 
In short, do not expect to find here any postmodern prevarications about the nature 
of truth and reality. It can and will be uncovered, using ‘objective’ methods of 
historical investigation (coupled, of course, with stark and sometimes disturbing 
visuals).15 However, Kobayashi and his manga avatar (who I will refer to as K) are 
not only waging a battle against ignorance, for such ignorance is aided and abetted 
by cowardice and moral failure.16  We see this visualised on page 22, where K 
practically jumps out of the frame to declaim that, unless the nation ‘has the 
balls’ to restore Yasukuni Shrine to its rightful place, there will be no hope of a 
‘Japanese restoration’ (or perhaps, a ‘revival of the Japanese people’).17 This is the 
underlying theme of the work, and makes for a narrative whose storyline is epic in 
structure, with the lone hero – the manga-fied everyman K – engaged in a quest 
against enemies of various sorts.18 The reader is invited to identify with the author 
via his avatar, and become a part of the battle for the restoration of Truth. This is 
visualised most clearly on page 12, where, after the formulaic query/call to arms: 
‘Goman kamashite yoka desu ka?’ (‘Will you permit me to be a little insolent?’) 
the reader is explicitly invited to join the quest for the truth (shinjitsu) about 
Yasukuni, in order to help rescue the nation from its ‘shameful’ state brought 
about by the misinformation of the unholy triumvirate of ‘politicians, scholars and 
the mass media’. 
The ‘argument’ of Yasukuniron works in piecemeal fashion, a form which is 
not only well-suited to manga format but also reflects a particular style of academic 
discourse in Japan, where the structure sometimes tends to be considerably less 
encumbered than in the West. As an opening gambit, Yasukuniron begins with a 
stark example of popular misunderstanding regarding Yasukuni – in this case, 
ignorance the Shinto doctrine and practice of bunshi ?  (lit. ‘separation of 
worship’, but best translated as ‘the ritual separation and transfer of an enshrined 
kami to another shrine’).19  After noting, quite correctly, that politicians in the 
National Diet frequently call for the ‘separation’ of the enshrined Class A war 
criminals at Yasukuni, K argues that the ritual process of bunshi in Shinto is 
akin to the transfer of a flame from one candle to another; in each case, nothing 
is lost of the orginal. On the contrary, the original flame/kami is by this means 
effectively multiplied (quite the opposite of our common-sense understanding of 
‘separation’). Before coming to the conclusion of this mini set-piece, K adds a 
personal anecdote. He too, we (literally) ‘see’, is briefly puzzled by the fact that 
a small shrine in his Tokyo neighborhood could be dedicated to Ōkununushi (a 
popular kami who plays a significant role in the early chronicles Kojiki and Nihon 
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shoki), when this kami’s ‘home’ is the grand Izumo Taisha in distant Shimane 
prefecture. The answer is, of course, that he/we/politicians do not get the true 
meaning of bunshi, in which is it quite reasonable to have a single kami enshrined 
in hundreds or even, with major kami like Inari, Tenjin and Hachiman, tens of 
thousands of shrines. And yet: ‘This is the Shinto idea’. Then the climax, with 
a mocking K pointing his finger: ‘If you were to “separate” the Class A war 
criminals, General Tōjō and the rest would remain in Yasukuni as well as appear 
in the new location . . . If this is what you want, then by all means, go ahead and 
“separate”!’20 
This brief tableau bears analysis, since it is representative of the style that 
characterises Kobayashi’s Gōmanist manga. While K’s presentation of the Shinto 
doctrine and ritual of bunshi is quite correct, it is here employed in a classic case 
of rhetorical bait and switch. When politicians, commentators or scholars call 
for a ‘separation’ of Class A war criminals from Yasukuni, they are not referring 
to the ‘orthodox’ doctrine of bunshi, but rather to the more elusive – and, it has 
been argued, palpably ‘modern’ – idea of the souls of Yasukuni being enshrined 
as a collective unit – a mass tama without distinction.21  This, at least according 
to the shrine itself, is the primary reason that the souls cannot be ‘separated’. 
As   Yasukuni   head   priest   Matsudaira   Nagayoshi   (1915–2005),   explained 
in 1987: 
!
That [i.e., separation] is absolutely impossible. In this shrine there is some- 
thing called a ‘seat’ (za), which acts as a cushion (zabuton) for the kami. In 
shrines other than Yasukuni, such a ‘seat’ does not exist. The 2.5 million 
soul-pillars rest on the same cushion. It is impossible to separate them from 
this (hikihansu koto wa dekimasen).22 
!
After a panel in which K notes that, in any event, only ‘atheists’ and ‘material- 
ists’ would conceive of telling certain enshrined kami that they alone are a ‘bother’ 
(jama) and need to placed elsewhere, this first salvo is quickly followed by an 
equally derisive rejection of the alternative proposal: to build a national ‘non- 
religious’ memorial for the war dead (kokuritsu tsuitō shisetsu). K’s point here is 
reliant entirely on emotion, based on a staple trope of Yasukuni war remembrance: 
the final promise of imperial soldiers to their comrades and loved ones that they 
would ‘meet again at Yasukuni’. He asks, with a sneer, whether politicians are 
prepared to say to these men (or their departed souls), just 60 years after the war’s 
end, that they will instead have to settle for a posthumous rendezvous at the 
‘National Memorial Facility’. This argument is continued througout chapter four, 
in which K – surely aware of the irony given the historical connection between 
Yasukuni and State Shinto – accuses the Koizumi administration (and opposition) 
of attempting to create a ‘new religion’ for the state, one that attempts to bypass 
the rituals of Shinto, Buddhism and Christianity, but ends up being merely a reli- 
gion without substance.23 
All throughout, the reader is peppered with images of various sorts: some 
realistic (K’s face, the neighborhood shrine), others ‘comic’ (caricatures of various 
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politicians), and still others abstract (tadpole-like souls swimming through the air, in 
search of their proper home) or palpably symbolic (a Shinto torii [gate] bathed in a 
bright glow). The author adds a panel above the images, in which he adds another 
layer of comment. Here, in the Gōmanist equivalent of a scholarly footnote, we read 
that while Shinto forms the basis of an unconscious ethos for all Japanese, it has 
only weak prescriptions for regulating external behavior. This is why commentators 
are led to the mistaken conclusion that Shinto is ‘flexible’ (yūzū ga kikumono) and 
therefore open to change at the whim of politics.24  While it is certainly true that 
premodern Shinto lacks the formality of doctrine found in most religious traditions, 
and is therefore, one might argue, more susceptible to political manipulation, the 
assumption that Shinto forms the unconscious core of the Japanese ethos is one that 
deserves more attention. I will return to this later in the essay. 
Chapter one – ‘The Truth about Yasukuni Group Enshrinement that is Unknown 
to National Diet Members’ (‘Kokkai giin ga shiranai Yasukuni gōshi no shinjitsu’) 
– picks up the theme of the ignorance of politicians in relation to the Yasukuni 
doctrine of ‘group enshrinement’ (gōshi). The opening pages, however, are 
devoted to reflection on the nature of war (as a nearly-universal modern phenom- 
enon, usually begun by Western powers), buttressed by a by-now familiar litany 
regarding the illegitimacy (and ‘victor’s justice’) of both the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial and San Francisco Peace Treaty. Noting that most of the contemporary 
debate on Yasukuni surrounds the issue of the 1978 enshrinement of the fourteen 
‘Class A’ war criminals, K boldly asserts that, in fact, this debate is based on a 
false premise: i.e., that these men actually were/are ‘Class A war criminals’. In 
fact, K asserts, citing the dissenting opinion of Indian Judge Pal, they – along with 
other 1850 or so ‘war criminals’ – are rather collective victims, even ‘martyrs’ 
(junnan shisha) of a ‘ceremony of savage retribution’ (yaban na hōfuku no gishiki) 
waged by the victorious Allies.25 
Here the argument begins to turn away from the opinions of weak-kneed politi- 
cians and leftist media towards that of the Japanese people, who, K claims, stand 
squarely on the right side of truth. On the one hand, Kobayashi Gōmanism leans 
heavily on the appeal of the author (and his avatars) as a lone crusader fighting for 
truth and justice, but in order to succeed he must also hearken to ethnic populism: 
‘we’ ordinary Japanese know the truth, even if our ‘leaders’ do not. As is familiar 
in contemporary conservative populism wherever it is found, a sharp divide is 
thus established between the elites (i.e., intellectuals, media, government) and the 
people (however vaguely defined).26 While there is thus a recognition of a national 
‘personality split’, it is one that may be healed over time, if we are willing to take 
the necessay steps.27  In Yasukuniron, this tension is resolved in the following 
fashion: postwar Japanese (including the bulk of politicians and media) were quite 
content with the postwar meaning of Yasukuni, but they have since either (a) lost 
interest because caught up in a ‘materialist’ culture, or (b) been negatively influ- 
enced by a few leftist politicians and the mass media, who since 1985 have effec- 
tively created the Yasukuni ‘problem’.28 In short, this is the story of a collective, 
and fairy recent, fall into ignorance – albeit one that is not primarily the fault of 
the people.29  The organic metaphor here is (disturbingly) familiar: the nation is 
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sick, and requires a strong dose of medicine – i.e., Gōmanism – to be brought back 
to health. 
Throughout this chapter, as elsewhere in Yasukuniron, the ‘argument’ is broken 
up by episodes of unabashed sentiment, or what we might call ‘human interest’ 
stories: first a one-page aside regarding an emotional song written by several 
‘war criminals’ in a Philippine jail cell, which not only became a hit in postwar 
Japan but had such an effect on the Philippine president that he was moved to 
release all Japanese prisoners of war; then a brief vignette regarding the author’s 
reception of a certificate (saishin no ki) from Yasukuni noting the posthumous 
‘deification’ of his own grandfather, who perished in Siberia during the war, and 
his decision in 1999 to contribute a manga-decorated lantern to Yasukuni for 
display during the annual Mitama Matsuri (several of which are reproduced in 
the manga).30 
Finally, just prior to the chapter’s close with a rousing call-to-arms, K begins 
another counter-argument against those who claim that Yasukuni is in fact a 
modern and derivative version of (State) Shinto, a nationalist ideology that is not 
representative of anything in Japanese religion, tradition or custom. This point is 
further elaborated in chapter two, where it makes up a large part of K’s analysis of 
the Japanese public’s ‘fall’ away from the truth about Yasukuni. As my analysis 
here is based primarily on the religious claims of Yasukuni and Yasukuniron, this 
is a ‘rebuttal’ that requires further attention. After establishing the black and white 
scenario of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ throughout chapter one, K gives us a very brief history 
of Shinto, in which he admits that what we call ‘Shinto’ has ‘naturally trans- 
formed over the course of history’. In short, though ‘Shinto may have a “founda- 
tion”, it is not thereby “fundamentalist” ’ (‘Shinto ni “genri” wa aru toshite, 
“genrishugi” wa nai’). On face, this seems a striking admission, since it runs against 
a common understanding of Shinto as the unchanging substructure (or, as K put is 
in the preface) ‘unconscious ethos’ of the Japanese people. However, with recent 
trends in Shinto scholarship – notably after the work of Kuroda Toshio, and more 
recently in the writings of John Breen and Mark Teeuwen – which question the 
very existence of anything we can reasonably call ‘Shinto’ prior to the eighteenth 
century, Kobayashi could hardly rely on such an uncritical ahistorical essentialism 
(K admits in particular the significant impact of Buddhism on Shinto, though the 
example provided is of architectural rather than doctrinal influence). K’s reply, 
here and in chapter two, is more subtle: (a) Yasukuni Shrine may be a ‘modern’ 
creation, but this is simply because it is dedicated to the construction of Japan as 
a modern nation; since this is a set of conditions that never existed in the past, 
there was literally no need for such a shrine before the Meiji Restoration; (b) 
following on this, he asks, by what criterion do we call something a ‘tradition’ or 
‘custom’? – is Meiji Shrine, K asks, also a product of the modern period, not a 
traditional shrine?; (c) on the other hand, Yasukuni is rooted in an ancient tradi- 
tion, i.e., the longstanding Japanese practice of ‘ancestor worship’ (sosen sūhai).31 
Thus, K argues, while Yasukuni as an institution may have ‘modern’ elements, it 
is squarely rooted in an ancient Japanese tradition of reverence for the spirits of 
the dead – whatever one might choose to call that tradition.32 Here we see a subtle 
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but important shift away from ‘Shinto’ to the practice of ancestor veneration as 
the root of Japanese spirit, culture and ‘identity’. 
!
!
Envisioning (with) the dead 
!
Embedded within Kobayashi’s treatment is a portrayal of Yasukuni, and by 
extension, the enshrined heroes who  sacrified their lives to build a modern 
Japan, and whose souls continue to protect Japan, as ‘victims’ of widespread 
(internal) ignorance and (external) violence. The violence of which the imperial 
army – and particularly the individuals judged as war criminals – is so often 
accused  is  here  turned  around  against  the  accusers.  This  is  dramatically 
visualised throughout Yasukuniron, in which every single image of the heroic 
dead is presented in a form that scholars of fascism would identify as kitsch – i.e., 
unambiguously sentimentalised, to the point of caricature (Figure 10.2), while the 
faces and figures of the ‘others’ – especially Chinese and Koreans – are generally 
rendered as cruel and vindictive monsters (Figure 10.3).33 This applies to a lesser 
extent to the depiction of Westerners as well as ‘internal others’ – politicians, the 
mass media and leftist activists and intellectuals – though the latter are more often 
depicted as being pathetic/slavish (politicians) or fanatics (leftists, media) 
(Figures 10.4 and 10.5). 
In all cases, the emphasis is clearly on the violence, both literal and figurative, 
that has been and continues to be done to Yasukuni-qua-the heroic dead-qua-‘the 
Japanese’ by others. The menace of internal violence is perfectly encapsulated in 
a small frame (see Figures 10.6 and 10.7, below), which depicts two leering 
figures with a newspaper representing the media, activists and politicians 
extending out of the Japanese islands to drop flaming torii on the heads of what 
are  presumably  ordinary  Japanese  people,  who  scramble  about  in  a  panic 
(Figure 10.6), while the spectre of external violence is dramatically depicted in 
several images on page 46, which show the ‘ethnic character’ of Japan literally 
melting away (subete massatsu shite), while foreigners (holding their respective 
national flags) look on with disdain, egged on by Japanese leftists who call for 
increasing ‘globalisation’ (Figure 10.7). 
!
!
Revisioning (state) Shinto as peace 
!
In order to support the claim that Yasukuni is a legitimate and traditional represen- 
tation of Japanese spirituality and identity and not (simply) a political or nationalist 
symbol as it is so often represented, K presents the doctrine and practice of Yasu- 
kuni as being founded on Japanese ancestor veneration, which is itself a specific 
instance of a more general desire to bring peace and harmony both to one’s loved 
ones and to the community at large. Here the argument runs in several directions. 
First, it includes an attempt to render the Japanese practice of ‘comforting the dead’ 
a natural and universal aspect of ‘national character’ – i.e., an (inviolable) part of 
culture and tradition – and thus ‘completely distinct from a practice that is rooted 
in nation or ethnicity’.34 At the same time, there are important differences between 
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Figure 10.4  Slavish politicians, p. 9. 
!
!
 
!
Figure 10.5  Fanatical media, p. 34. 
!
the various religious understandings of the afterlife. As opposed to Christianity, K 
asserts, where spirits are called home to be with the one God, in Japanese poly- 
theism kami can be found literally anywhere and everywhere, and those who die 
are automatically considered to be kami or buddhas. Moreover, as opposed to the 
Christian separation of this world and the next, for ‘we Japanese’, the dead remain 
among us, even, as the accompanying graphic indicates, within the hustle and 
bustle of urbanised modern life. So far, this argument suggests that non-Japanese 
should understand and respect these differences in the Japanese understanding of 
the afterlife. There is also here an implication that the Japanese have a closer, more 
immediate relation to the dead, who live among them, than do Christians – and this 
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Figure 10.6  Violence of the internal other, p. 12. 
!
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Figure 10.7  Violence of the external other, p. 46. 
!
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difference plays a role in understanding the importance of Yasukuni to the Japa- 
nese national character and identity. But the discussion of religious differences 
does not end there; on pages 42 and 43 K presents a sharp contrast between the 
peaceful and tolerant Japanese afterlife (where everyone is automatically raised to 
the status of a kami or buddha), and the Chinese belief, ‘in which the flesh of the 
dead is torn off their bones by their bitter enemies, and the bones are ground to a 
powder, which is then consumed’.35  In short, while Yasukuni Shinto is based 
on a universal need to comfort the dead, the unique elements of the traditional 
Japanese concept of the afterlife provide a tenor of tolerance and peace that is in 
stark contrast to that found in countries such as China (Figures 10.8 and 10.9) – 
which, hypocritically but perhaps unsurprisingly, practices the very same form of 
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Figure 10.8  Chinese afterlife, p. 42. 
!
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Figure 10.9  Japanese afterlife, p. 42. 
!
!
posthumous violence on the Japanese war dead as they imagine happens in the 
Chinese afterlife. 
Without getting into the fact that both Chinese and Japanese understandings of 
the afterlife are extremely varied (largely as a result of both countries having 
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Figure 10.10  ‘The people’ honouring Yasukuni, p. 39. 
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Figure 10.11  ‘Protecting’ Yasukuni, p. 22. 
!
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complex and highly syncretic religious histories), we might note that K’s analysis 
leaves out the deeply rooted Sino-Japanese conception of the the dead as ‘restless’ 
and potentially ‘wrathful’ spirits (onryō or goryō) caught in a state of limbo – a 
popular belief which has roots that date to the ninth century, and very much 
continues to this day (as witnessed by the success of recent Japanese horror films 
like ‘The Ring’ (‘Ringu’) and ‘The Grudge’ (‘Juon’). More to the point, it would 
appear that this belief was the primary instigation for the establishment of 
Yasukuni Shrine itself as a place to ‘pacify’ the spirits of the war dead. In other 
words, the shine may have originally been intended not to protect the souls of the 
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heroic dead, but rather to protect the living from their unsettled wrath!36 While this 
is clearly not an idea promoted by either Yasukuni or the Yūshūkan today, it does 
relate, however unintentionally, to Kobayashi’s implication that his heroic spirits 
have every right to be wrathful. Throughout the manga, K frames the act of 
pilgrimage to Yasukuni in terms of both honoring and pacifying the spirits – albeit 
less for their violent deaths in battle as for what they have suffered since the war. 
!
!
Individuation and nationalisation of the ‘heroic spirits’ 
!
As has been noted, one of the central tensions in Yasukuni Shinto is that between 
the deceased spirits as individuals – with distinctive personalities, ambitions and 
family relationships, and as subjects – i.e., embodiments of the national spirit of 
heroism, loyalty and sacrifice in the face of near-certain death. Within State Shinto 
logic, this was normally glossed with the notion that the Imperial State is an exten- 
sion of the family, and thus all individualised feelings and duties must be subli- 
mated (or sacrificed) to the higher calling of national loyalty. In practice, what we 
see is an accomodation to individuation of the heroic dead, at least within certain 
limits. On a practical level, of course, it would be impossible to deny the emotional 
connection between the war dead enshrined at Yasukuni and their loved ones left 
behind – not least because of the fact that this is (unsurprisingly) a central theme 
of so many of their letters and diaries.37  Moreover, the emotional bond is what 
brings many to the shrine itself; family members go to Yasukuni to ‘meet’ and 
‘pray for/to’ their deceased kin. The ‘doctrinal’ facts that these individuals have 
been posthumously elevated into mikoto or kamigami, and thus separated from all 
worldly ties, or rendered into a single mass tama/kami that protects the nation, 
holds little resonance for Yasukuni visitors, who approach the dead as they would 
at any Buddhist temple or family altar. And this extends even to those without 
enshrined family members. Indeed, the final chamber of the Yūshūkan museum, 
which displays the personal letters of hundreds of these young men, is by far the 
most moving part of the museum. Whatever one’s politics, it is hard not to be 
stirred by the words of these men – particularly when they speak of their parents 
and children. What is missing, of course, is any sense that these men may have 
been divided in their loyalties, or hesistant to sacrifice themselves for the Emperor 
and ‘family-state’. While they are thus inviduated in terms of the specifics of their 
letters, these same letters take on a standard form that serves to erase any trace of 
resistance. It goes without saying that a more comprehensive analysis of the writ- 
ings of the Japanese military during the war – including the tokkōtai – provides a 
much more diverse field of perspectives.38 
In the pages of Yasukuniron, Kobayashi follows the Yūshūkan museum in this 
‘accommodation’ of the individual-qua-subject. In fact, the attempt to render in 
graphic form the heroic lives – and more importantly, deaths – of these men is 
fundamental to Kobayashi’s ‘thesis’, which, as noted, relies heavily on the evoking 
an emotional attachment to ‘our ancestors’ (ware ware no sosen) In this sense, 
chapter three: ‘Japanese Spirits: The Heroic Suicides of the Postwar’ (‘Nihonjin 
no tama: Shusen jiketsu resshi’), forms the heart of the manga. After chastising 
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the postwar Japanese for so quickly adopting US-imposed principles and values 
– and, at the instigation of the fanatical left-wing – coming to spit upon those 
who fought and lost the war, K goes on a quest to uncover the personal stories of 
some extraordinary heroes. While the Yūshūkan and others have paid attention to 
the lives and deaths of many of these ‘ordinary’ men and women, K ups the ante 
by retrieving the heroic legends of a few of the roughly 600 individuals who 
gave up their lives after the war’s end on 15 August, 1945. In these brief stories, 
which combine a few dramatic and gory images with an abundance of text, we see 
a similar pattern emerge as with the Yūshūkan letters. Though the stories are 
unique in some respects, they merge together to create a common, nationalised 
subject. Notable througout these heroic tales is the fact that, while the the apparent 
moral is the unswerving loyalty of these men as imperial subjects – embodied in 
their refusal to accept American domination39  – their reproduced letters reveal 
their love for their family members, whom they will ‘meet again’ at Yasukuni. 
This is continued in the following section, in which five additional letters from 
fallen soldiers are reproduced on lined paper.40 In short, the immediate emotional 
appeal of family ties serves as a ‘hook’ to draw us back to Yasukuni, which 
becomes nothing more or less than the ‘holographic entry point’ through which 
‘we Japanese’ can return ‘home’ to our identity as national subjects.41 
!
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The paligenetic imperative: manga as tool for revival of the 
Japanese ‘spirit’ 
!
Though Kobayashi’s manga are presented as expressions of his own personal 
(and ‘insolent’) opinions, their very popularity betrays a receptive audience of 
like-minded readers, and renders them worthy of study as a sociocultural phenom- 
enon. Moreover, Kobayashi’s personal links to the revisionist Liberal Historio- 
graphy Study Group (‘Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai’), the Japanese Society for 
History Textbook Reform (‘Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai’), as well as 
the Japan Conference (‘Nihon kaigi’)42 suggest a larger goal of educational, social 
and religious – if not outright political – transformation.43 The reader is explictly 
invited to join the fight for a revival of the true Japanese spirit or culture – rooted 
in the virtues of respect, filial piety, national pride, self-sacrifice and, last but not 
least, a sense of ‘heroic history’. To do so, they must first identify with Yasukuni, 
which both symbolises this spirit and literally ‘embodies’ the victimhood of the 
nation’s heroes to the continuing violence of ‘others’.44 Thus, what is aimed for 
here is more than simply a ‘closed community of mourning’, since the process of 
individuated and collective mourning is conceived as a form of self and communal 
realisation.45 Though it thrives on a bombastic method of ‘insolence’, Kobayashi’s 
Neo-Gōmanism is, at bottom technique of subjectivity; i.e., an ideology that looks 
to reconstruct a (national) identity via individual conversion. Crucially, this 
conversion takes place through identification – which is at least as much a visual 
and emotive process as a cognitive one. And it is a conversion that can only effec- 
tively take place at Yasukuni Shrine. In all of these senses, Neo-Gōmanism here, 
as elsewhere, is committed to the paligenetic imperative, which Roger Griffin has 
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Figure 10.12  K ‘inviting’ us to ‘see’ the spirits, p. 146. 
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Figure 10.13  Yasukuni, if left ‘unprotected’, p. 196. 
!
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argued is central to fascism; i.e., the myth of the a ‘purifying, cathartic, national 
rebirth’.46  The trope of (national-cum-individual) sickness, humiliation and 
victimhood followed by an apotheosis of rebirth is visually encapsulated in the 
final page of chapter seven (previously published in Sensoron II), in which K 
stands, Christ-like, in front of the mass of ordinary Japanese, urging us to recog- 
nise that the very world in which we live has been constructed on the pillars of 
those who sacrificed their lives in the war (Figure 10.12). Here, the visual turns 
things around, so that the invited reader is placed in a position behind the spirits 
(who appear in their usual ghostly, benevolent form), facing K and those who 
have already realised the truth.47 
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In its unspecified promise of both communal healing and individual redemp- 
tion, here, as elsewhere, the imagery resonates with Griffin’s analysis of the fascist 
mythos, which attempts to ‘unleash strong affective energies’ through a vision of 
reality by positing an organic nation in a state of decay that, because it possesses 
a life cycle, can be revitalised through the manipulation of a group psyche. What 
is distinctive here, however, is that rather than ‘appealing to individuals to sacri- 
fice themselves for a destiny that will bring them greatness’, the reader is invited 
to simply identify with those who have done the ‘work’ of sacrifice – those who 
remain unsettled due to our lack of recognition. 
!
!
‘Land of kami, land of the dead’ 
!
This brings us back to the issue of death, deification, and pacification in relation 
to the intertwined theologies of State Shinto, Yasukuni Shrine and Yasukuniron. 
The concluding chapter to the manga – ‘Land of Kami is also the Land of the 
Dead’ (‘Kami no kuni wa shisha no kuni demo aru’) – provides us with an effec- 
tive re-entry point. It begins with several questions, posed as a challenge to the 
reader: Have we Japanese become a-religious (mushūkyō)? Have we Japanese 
embraced materialism (muibutsuron)? This is followed by a personal story in 
which Kobayashi relates his conversion from youthful atheism. While anxiously 
waiting for a loved one undergoing surgery, K realises that he has nothing to 
which he can pray to, and that his previous unbelief is little more than egoism. 
And yet, he relates, at this time he had completely forgotten how to ‘give thanks’ 
or ‘take a vow’.48 After a few short vignettes depicting key events in the author’s 
life, each of which concludes with the familiar image of a deceased spirit hovering 
above, K begins to ‘pay attention to the glance’ of the spirits of the deceased – 
who are very much ‘living with us’. In order to more fully hear what the spirits are 
trying to convey to him, he decides to pay homage to the dead at Yasukuni Shrine, 
where he becomes enveloped with a feeling of ‘public spirit’ (kōteki na kimochi). 
If it was not already evident, by the final chapter of Yasukuniron the basic 
‘theology’ of Yasukuni – at least, in Kobayashi’s interpretation – becomes clear. 
The shrine is a place in which we the living can go to meet with the dead. By 
paying homage at the shrine (in ‘traditional’ manner), and by simply ‘paying 
attention’ to these spirits via an exchange of glances, we confirm our own history 
and establish both our indiviudal and national identity. In short, we are engaging 
in a populist version of ‘spirit pacification’ (tamashizume or chinkon), a ritual that 
dates back to the original ‘State Shinto’ instituted under Emperor Tenmu in the 
late-seventh and early-eighth centuries CE. As Naumann has argued, state cult 
ceremonies of this time seem to have been centered on petitions, thanksgiving and 
warding off evil. Pacification of Spirit ceremonies were among the most important 
rites for imperial-cum-state protection. Performed near the winter solstice, the 
primary goal of chinkonsai was the restoration of the vital power (tama) of the 
emperor in analogy to the sun (and the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu).49  In a later 
context, the ‘pacification of spirits’ took on a quite different sense, with the intro- 
duction (from the continent) of the belief that once a person dies, their ‘soul’ or 
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‘spirit’ (tama) lingers in an unsettled state until it is correctly ‘addressed’ by the 
proper funeral rituals and appropriate period of mourning. 
As noted above, from the mid-Heian period, a belief in onryō or ‘vengeful 
ghosts’ became widespread among both elites and commoners. According to this 
idea, unsettled spirits – those wronged in life, or whose death came under less than 
ideal circumstances – would cause all sorts of trouble to those left behind, espe- 
cially but not exclusively their enemies. The classic instance of this is the posthu- 
mous deification of the courtier Sugawara no Michizane (845–903) as Tenman-tenjin 
in the tenth century.50 In any event, due to an early Shinto sense of death itself as a 
form ‘impurity’ and ‘pollution’, in Japan Buddhism has largely been the tradition 
responsible for dealing with matters of death, and specific rituals (kuyō) were 
developed in order to appease and ‘pacify’ these spirits.51  Interestingly, though 
these ideas about death and the afterlife seems to elide well – even sharing key 
terms – with certain aspects of State Shinto, the ‘Buddhistic’ focus on individual 
spirits who are or may be unsettled runs against several other elements of State 
Shinto and Yasukuni doctrine and ritual practice – in particular the understanding 
that the process of divinisation is one in which the ‘souls’ of the dead heroes 
are enshrined en masse, as a collective and inseparable unit. As we have seen, in 
Yasukuniron, as in the Yūshūkan museum, the emphasis is squarely placed on the 
‘human’ side of the story, with the dead heroes visualised clearly by the bereaved 
(and the reader) as idealised, peaceful and individuated spirits, chagrined only by 
the lack of respect that is given them in contemporary Japan. 
Finally, a key aspect of Yasukuni theology – again, as interpreted through 
the lens of Yasukuniron – is the importance of pilgrimage. Although Kobayashi 
makes note of the Mitama Festival – held in mid-July at Yasukuni for the ‘conso- 
lation’ (nagusameru) of the souls of the dead – he places greater emphasis on 
the necessity of regular visitations to the shrine as the most effective way of 
consoling the heroic spirits, via a process of memorialisation and identification. 
But pilgrimage can also be understood as a means of self-purification on the 
part of the pilgrim. As Brian Bocking notes, in Japan this concept dates back to 
the medieval Watarai priestly limeage, who promoted pilgrimage to the Outer 
(Gekū) Shrine at Ise as a form of ‘self-purification, progress towards enlighten- 
ment and the uncovering of the inborn spiritual balues of purity, honesty and 
compassion’.52 In the Edo period, popular pilgrimage to Ise experienced another 
boom, which helped in the establishment of a transregional religious (if not specif- 
ically ‘Shinto’) consciousness.53  In Yasukuniron, it is through an exchange of 
‘glances’ that the consolation-qua-identification-qua-purification takes place, and 
this requires that the spirits be individuated as much as possible, even while 
conforming to a particular ‘type’. Though the rhetoric of their day called on these 
young men and women to ‘extinguish themselves through service to the state’ 
(messhi hōkō), at Yasukuni and in Yasukuniron they are invoked as individuated 
spirits still very much among us. It is only our neglect of Yasukuni that puts them 
(and by extension, us) in danger of being extinguished. According to Kobayashi, 
Japan is indeed a ‘land of kami’,54 but, even more importantly, it is a ‘land of the 
(living) dead’.55 
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In  this  last  respect,  however  unconsciously,  the  Neo-Gōmanist  theology 
aligns remarkably with the National Learning doctrine of Hirata Atsutane. 
Atsutane is infamous for his fascination (some would say obsession) with the 
spirit world; a place that he believed was humanity’s ‘true home’. As he writes in 
his Yūgenben: 
!
When one grows old and dies, one’s body will return to dust, but one’s spirit 
(tamashii) will not disappear. Returning to the Hidden Realm (kakuriyo), it 
will be subject to the reign of Ōkuninushi no Ōkami, accept his commands, 
and from Heaven it will protect not only its descendents but all those related 
to it. These are the ‘hidden matters’ (kakurigoto) of man.56 
!
For Atsutane, the other world of the spirits may be ‘hidden’ from our everyday 
gaze, but it remains accessible, as it is all around us. It is in fact ‘a very real 
world, in constant and very close contact, always engaging with the world we 
inhabit’. In order to return to the Age of the Gods, all we need to do, then, is 
truly open our eyes. Finally, although the imperial ancestress and sun goddess 
Amaterasu was the central figure in kokugaku as well as the state-sponsored impe- 
rial cult of the twentieth century, here her position of supremacy is co-opted by 
Ōkuninushi, the ‘Great Lord of the Land’ who acts as both king and judge of the 
Hidden Realm. Although Yasukuniron does not present Ōkuninushi in this way, 
the basic structure of Atsutane’s spiritual world, as well his sense that life in this 
world is fleeting and is ultimately given to us in order that we perfect our ability 
to perform ‘true acts of virtue’ – of which the highest is sacrifice for the nation – is 
a perfect fit. 
With regard to going against the ultranationalist grain, it is interesting to 
note that for all of the emphasis on sacrifice and heroism found in the pages of 
Yasukuniron, the figure who, in State Shinto ideology, is the presumed focus for 
such loyalty – the literal and figurative ‘head’ of the national body – is virtually 
absent. Indeed, just as he has not been seen at Yasukuni Shrine itself for 30 years, 
the emperor is hardly even mentioned in Kobayashi’s tribute to Yasukuni.57 With 
respect to the theology of Yasukuni/Yasukuniron, we may conclude from this that: 
(a) the emperor, just as he did during the period of ultranationalism (and before), 
functions more as an ‘empty’ symbol than a real presence;58 or (b) the lack of the 
Emperor suggests a turn towards a more ‘populist’ appeal to the war dead as ‘our 
heroic ancestors’ – and the ‘pillars’ (hashira) upon which the modern state has 
been constructed. In other words, though this could hardly be admitted, perhaps 
this absence masks an understanding that we have reached the stage where the 
national body no longer needs a head in order to function. 
!
!
Yasukuni Shrine as ‘revisionist manga’ 
!
In this final section, by way of conclusion, I would like to consider whether 
Yasukuni Shrine might be understood as a form of ‘revisionist manga’. First, as 
noted  above,  Kobayashi  clearly  wants  to  emphasise  the  double  identity  of 
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Yasukuni: as both traditional and modern. In his reading of Meiji history, 
Yasukuni is the original symbol of ‘Japan’ as a modern nation-state, and (thus) the 
key to a full-fledged ‘restoration’ of the Japanese character, which has been lost 
since the war (but crucially, remains deeply rooted within the hearts of the 
common people); at the same time, Yasukuni represents a fundamental aspect – if 
not the very essence – of Japanese culture and tradition: respect and reverence for 
the ancestors (whether one chooses to call this ‘Shinto’ or not).59  This double 
identity is physically enacted on the sandō or pathway leading to Yasukuni Shrine 
itself. Walking towards the shrine, the first torii one passes through is a massive, 
iron-covered structure, resonant of modernity and technology (and, some might 
argue, fascist monumentalism). This is followed by a second torii, somewhat 
smaller (though still imposing), plated in a softer bronze. Finally, as one comes 
closer to the wooden gates leading to the central haiden (worship hall) and honden 
(main sanctuary), one passes through a third torii, constructed in simple, unpainted 
wood. In short, the Yasukuni visitor gradually moves from the massive portal of 
modernity to the humble, traditional gate (though in fact all three torii have been 
constructed in shinmei style, which reproduces the torii of Ise Shrine, often 
considered the most ‘authentic’ or ‘pure’ form of Shinto architecture). This 
progression through the various torii, one that is, not incidentally, faithfully repro- 
duced (in color) on the cover and initial two pages of Yasukuniron, provides a 
simple but effective metaphor for Yasukuni itself. 
The grounds of Yasukuni contain a number of buildings, none of which would 
be out of place in a ‘traditional’ Shinto shrine – except for the fact that several of 
these structures, including the haiden, sakuramon (wooden doors, emblazoned 
with large gilded kikumon or chrysanthemum Imperial crests), kagami (mirror) 
that resides in the sanctuary, and, as noted, the first two ‘modern’ torii, are unusu- 
ally large and imposing.60 However, unlike most Shinto shrines, the primary focus 
of reverence at Yasukuni is literally ‘not there’ – though the shrine does have 
shintai (the mirror as well as a sword), the 2.5 million ‘souls’ have no physical 
location or embodiment. Moreover, they are not, at least according to the official 
Yasukuni doctrine, any longer individual spirits with connections to family and 
loved ones – they have ‘merged with’ the national (or, as critics would have it, 
imperial) will. From this it could be argued that, for all the rituals that take place 
there, the ‘shrine’ is already a ‘memorial’ – albeit one in which ‘memory’ is force- 
fully reinscribed by the Yūshūkan museum, which acts as an ‘intertext’ or expla- 
nadum to Yasukuni, filling the massive structures and empty spaces with a 
streamlined narrative of ‘historical facts’ – and concluding with an overtly 
emotional appeal to identifications with the victims-qua-heroes of the war ‘to 
establish the modern nation’. In short, Yasukuni Shrine functions as the concrete 
embodiment of a revisioning of prewar (but largely modern) Japanese religious 
rituals and socio-political ideas, whose aim is at least as much ‘national recon- 
struction’ as ‘spirit pacification’.61 It is a three-dimensional ‘text’ whose stark 
imagery and by-turns aggressive and sentimental ‘intertext’ (i.e., Yūshūkan) 
appeals directly to our raw emotions, while relying upon an effective erasure of 
the diversity that complicates history and religious tradition. 
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Although State Shinto was officially ‘disestablished’ after the war, and has, 
along with ultra-nationalism and militarism, come to be repudiated by the vast 
majority of the Japanese people, the institutionalised form of Shinto as embodied 
in the postwar Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja honchō) contains more than a 
few hints of its more obviously politicised forerunner.62 This is most clear in the 
promotion (and widely accepted notion) of Shinto as a cultural (if not ‘ethnic’) 
form that is somehow inherent to being ‘Japanese’ (a belief that often goes 
hand-in-hand with a reluctance to label Shinto a ‘religion’). Indeed, Shinto- 
consciousness – or, since the word ‘Shinto’ itself is not commonly employed, 
kami, jinja, or matsuri-conciousness – plays a significant role in contemporary 
Japanese national identity, though only when reframed in terms that make it 
appear ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious’ or ‘political’.63  Explicitly anti-political 
and anti-religious, this ‘folkism’ or ‘ethno-nationalism’ (minzokushugi) as a 
general pattern of thought remains strong in contemporary Japan, and can be 
readily tapped into by those whose aims are in fact political.64 
!
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Notes 
!
1  All images are from Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Shin gōmanizumu sengen special: Yasuku- 
niron [Neo-Gōmanism Manifesto Special: On Yasukuni], published by Gentōsha in 
2005 (hereafter: Yasukuniron). 
2  While a detailed discussion of the difference between the two terms is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, either of the two commonly used terms could be used simply in 
order to highlight the fact that the representation and argument are rooted in techniques 
of sequential art. 
3  For detailed discussions see for example, Clifford, ‘Cleansing History’; Iwasaki and 
Richter, ‘Historical Revisionism’. 
4  The Yasukuni controversy has received significant treatment in Japanese scholarship 
(e.g., Murakami, Yasukuni no shisō; Ōe, Yasukuni jinja; Tanaka, Yasukuni no sengoshi; 
Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai). English sources tend to focus on the political and foreign 
policy issues, though a few, such as Powles, Yasukuni Jinja Hōan; Antoni, ‘Yasukuni- 
Jinja’; Nelson, ‘Social Memory’; and Breen, ‘The Dead and the Living’, pay attention 
to Yasukuni ritual and doctrine. See Matsumoto et al., ‘War Responsibility’, for a brief, 
balanced introduction to the issues. 
5  Originally the ‘nation’ here did not mean some abstract ‘Japan’, but rather the very 
concrete (and still vulnerable) fledgling Meiji state. Thus, while those who fought and 
died on the side of the Restoration find a posthumous home in Yasukuni, this is not 
the case for those who fought against the Meiji state, either in the battles leading up to 
the Restoration or in the sporadic uprisings following its promulgation. 
6  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 7. 
7  These facts (save the mention of the Britons) are all noted in the ‘overnote’ to page 7 
of Yasukuniron. 
8 Because of what they see as its belated provenance, many contemporary scholars 
pointedly refuse to employ the term ‘State Shinto’ (see, e.g., Nitta, ‘Shinto as “Non- 
religion” ’, 268). While acknowledging that the term might lead to the assumption of a 
government-directed Shinto that was all powerful and conceptually unified from the 
Meiji Restoration through the end of the Asia-Pacific War (which was certainly not the 
case), I contend that it is a useful moniker for the self-consciously ‘non-religious’ (or 
‘supra-religious’) discourse of state-centered ‘Shinto’ that emerged in the aftermath of 
the (failed) Great Promulgation Campaign (taikyō senpu undō) of 1870–84, and, after 
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a few decades of uneven development, reached a peak during the Asia-Pacific War. 
Though institutionally disestablished with SCAP’s 1945 Shinto Directive, the legacy 
of State Shinto ideology can be felt today – and not only at Yasukuni Shrine (see 
Bocking, ‘Changing Images’, 183; Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 4). 
!
9 National Learning sought to ‘recover’ an idealised, pure mentality and world view 
ascribed to the ancient Japanese, to return to the thought and consciousness of the 
ancients before the country became . . . ‘polluted’ by contact with foreign culture 
and religion. Buddhism was attacked as the agency most to blame for Japan’s loss 
of its original way of life. 
(Hardacre, Shinto and State, 16) 
!
Interestingly, by substituting the word ‘wartime’ for ancient, and replacing ‘the leftist 
mass media’ for ‘Buddhism’, this becomes an acute précis of Kobayashi’s Gōmanism. 
10  Inflected, of course, via the writings and institutional work of figures such as Ōkuni 
Takamasa (1792–1871), an immensely influential figure who, while rejecting ‘Hirata 
Shinto’ as one among many Shinto schools unsuited to the new age, was deeply 
indebted to the ideas of Atsutane himself. 
11  Expressed in this way, one might cite the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku 
chokugo) as the ‘founding’ document of State Shinto ideology, despite – or perhaps 
because of – the fact that it explicitly avoids terms specific to Shinto, or any other ‘reli- 
gious’ tradition, and is purposely vague in content. As support for this, we might note 
the way in which the Rescript quickly took on the form of a ‘sacred text’ (see Yamamoto 
and Imano, Kindai kyōiku, 75–89). If, indeed, the Rescript forms the bones of ultrana- 
tionalist Shinto, then it is the ‘National Morality’ (kokumin dōtoku) writings of philoso- 
pher Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), especially Rinri to shūkyō no kankei [Relation 
between Ethics and Religion] (1902) and Kokumin dōtoku gairon [Introduction to 
National Morality] (1912), that provide the flesh, to be further filled out in early Shōwa 
by the Kokutai no hongi [Cardinal Principles of the National Polity] (1937) – which 
makes explicit reference to Yasukuni – and Shinmin no michi [Way of the Imperial 
Subject] (1941), two documents promulgated by Doctrinal Bureau (Kyōgakuka) of the 
Education Ministry. To be sure, State Shinto – at least in an ideological sense – was at 
least as indebted to ‘National Morality’ as it was to ‘National Learning’. 
12  See Kawakami Hajime’s succinct formulation of what he called kokkakyō (state cult), as 
cited in Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai 30–31. Also see Hardacre 1989, 90–92, on the 
state’s ‘concerted and sustained effort to promote a cult of the war dead and historical 
loyalists’, via the creation and support of ‘Special Shrines’ such as Yasukuni, which, by 
mid-Meiji, ‘received respect exceeded only by that accorded to the Ise Grand Shrines’. 
13  I’m using the term ‘revisioning’ deliberately to refer to two things: (a) the technique of 
‘revisionist’ history – which Yasukuniron certainly engages in; and (b) the more 
literal sense of ‘making over’ or ‘recreating Yasukuni in a visual way’ via the graphic 
techniques of manga. 
14  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 5. 
15  As Sharon Kinsella (Adult Manga, 112–113) notes, ‘neo-conservative’ seinen manga 
as a whole tend to rely on a realistic and objective narrative that effectively masks their 
ideological content. While this applies to Kobayashi, who relies heavily on realistic (as 
well as photographic) images, it is important to note that Neo-Gōmanism also employs 
caricature (Figures 10.4 and 10.5) and symbolism (Figure 10.6), as well as a form of 
kitschy sentimentalism that verges on ‘fantasy’ (Figure 10.2). Also, whereas Kinsella 
critiques neo-conservative manga for (deceptively) striving to eliminate the authorial 
function, this would be hard to apply to Kobayashi, who fairly revels in making himself 
(as K) the hero of his own works. 
16 In fact, Kobayashi the author has two distinct manga avatars: K, who acts as the 
protagonist of the stories, and another figure, who I will call G (for the Gōmanist) 
who personifies and gives voices to the more strident, haughty or insolent side of the 
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argument. G, who resembles K in features, is always pictured in a seated position, 
outside – usually above – the frame itself (or spliced between frames), wearing what 
appears to be a nineteenth-century European military uniform, complete with epau- 
lettes and stars surrounding his head. Though G is intended to personify the haughtier 
aspect of K, he also acts as the supplier of additional ‘facts’ to buttress K’s harangue. 
17  ‘Nihonkoku wa dōdō to Yasukuni jinja o mamoru kiryō o torimodosanuba naranai! 
Sore nakushite Nipponjin no fukkatsu wa nai!’ (Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 12). 
18  Throughout Yasukuniron, and the Gōmanist oeuvre more generally, Kobayashi paints 
a portrait of ‘himself’ as an astute, angry, but otherwise ordinary middle-aged everyman. 
19  To Kobayashi’s credit, he does not, like many commentators, avoid the trickier ‘religious’ 
aspects of the Yasukuni problem; indeed, these become a centerpiece for his argument 
about the ‘criminal ignorance’ (hanzaiteki muchi) of politicians, scholars and the mass 
media. Of course, much of what he says is either incorrect or grossly oversimplified. 
20  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 6, emphasis in original. 
21  See Matsumoto et al., ‘War Responsibility’, 26. 
22  Quoted in Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, 74. 
23  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 89. 
24  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 6. 
25  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 13–14. 
26  This divide finds concise visual expression in a small frame on page 20, in which we 
see representatives of this unholy trinity literally crushing the people, with K himself 
looking on in rage. The accompanying caption reads: ‘The feelings of the nation’s 
people are being trampled underfoot by those postwar leftists in the mass media and 
government who use Yasukuni as a political tool’. Disgust at politicians ‘playing poli- 
tics’ in times of national crisis or with ‘sacred’ sites or symbols is also a staple of 
contemporary populist rhetoric in the United States. 
27  As shown by Takahashi Tetsuya (Yasukuni mondai, 194–197), this way of thinking 
about the Japanese – as a single ‘we’ that has lost its prior unity – continues to play a 
role in shaping debates about history and culture. Takahashi takes critic Katō Norihiro 
to task for extending this ‘nationalist’ assumption, even while presenting himself as a 
‘moderate’. Unsurprisingly, Kobayashi has attacked Katō from the other direction, 
accusing him of a ‘masochistic’ approach to history (an accusation which is also 
applied to Takahashi’s own Yasukuni mondai, mentioned several times within the 
pages of Yasukuniron). 
28  Prior to his ‘official’ visit to Yasukuni on 15 August 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro explained that he would not follow the ‘traditional’ Shinto practice of two 
bows, two claps, and one bow but would simply make a single bow before the honden. 
According to K, in thus bowing to left-wing media pressure, Nakasone inaugurated 
the sad legacy of the Prime Minister’s ‘private’ vs. ‘public’ visits to Yasukuni 
(Yasukuniron 32–35). 
29  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 15–22. 
30  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 16–19. 
31  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 21. 
32  Besides, he goes on, if Yasukuni were merely a manifestation of the prewar state cult, 
how has it continued its ‘splendid existence’ to this day? Though somewhat fallacious 
in logic, this query does pose an important question: why, despite the controversies, is 
Yasukuni still frequented by so many ‘ordinary’ Japanese – compared, say, to the 
Chidorigafuchi cemetary, built in 1959 as a secular alterative? Though this is a question 
whose  answer  would  require  empirical  fieldwork,  I  suggest  that  Yasukuni’s 
relative popularity is due to the fact that it is a major shrine in a populous area, whose 
raison d’être attracts the immediate family members of the war dead (though their 
numbers are falling off steadily), as well as anyone with a sense that the war dead 
should be ‘mourned’ in some fashion. Katō Norihiro (Haisengo ron) has argued that 
the Yasukuni ideology persists precisely because of the leftist opposition. While 
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Takahashi (‘Japanese Neo-nationalism’) has criticised this point as anachronistic, it 
cannot be completely discounted. In general, though, I think we would be mistaken to 
place too much emphasis on the ideological motivations of the ordinary Yasukuni 
visitor, which – like the motivations of the war dead – no doubt range widely, or may 
even be irrelevant. Kobayashi is probably not far off in his assertion that most people 
go to Yasukuni because they have become accustomed to it as ‘an established place to 
meet the spirits’ (teichaku shiteshimatta tama tono deai no ba na no da) (Yasukuniron, 
98) – though one conclusion that might be drawn from this assertion is that the nation- 
alist rhetoric of the shrine and museum really doesn’t mean all that much to most 
people. 
33  Of course, the depiction of foreigners (especially Westerners and Chinese) as ‘devils’ 
(oni) and ‘monsters’ (yōkai) has a stalwart history, dating back to visual portrayals of 
the arrival of Commodore Perry and his men in 1853, and appearing as a staple in 
‘militarist’ manga beginning with Utagawa Yoshiiku’s Kokkei Yamatoshiki (Comical 
Record of Japanese History), published during the first Sino-Japanese war (1894–95); 
see Addiss, Japanese Ghosts, 18. 
34  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 38–39. Though K here neglects the important distinction 
between comforting the dead as family or ancestor spirits, and comforting the ‘war 
dead’ – including those to whom you bear no relation. The latter concept only emerged 
in the Meiji period, in the context Japan’s first ‘modern wars’ against China (1894–95) 
and Russia (1904–05), and thus was unquestionably a product of emergent nationalism. 
See Takanaka, ‘Architecture’, 236. 
35  The idea of misunderstandings of Yasukuni based on cultural differences regarding the 
afterlife, particularly with respect to Chinese vs. Japanese views of death, is fairly 
common. Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka both 
raised the same point in response to foreign criticism of Koizumi’s 2004 visit to Yasu- 
kuni (cited in Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, 152–153). 
36  See Antoni, ‘Yasukuni-Jinja’, 133; Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, 58–59. 
37  This tension is perfectly encapsulated by the recent phenomenon of the presentation, by 
family members of unwed deceased soldiers, of ‘bride dolls’ (hanayome ningyō) to 
Yasukuni. Initially hesitant, the shrine has come to accept and even promote this prac- 
tice, despite the fact that it clearly runs against several key components of Yasukuni 
theology. See Schatteschneider, ‘Work of Sacrifice’. 
38  See, e.g., Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze. 
39  In this regard, it is worth noting that Kobayashi employs the term jiketsu – which can 
mean both suicide and self-determination – rather than the more common (and explicit) 
term for suicide: jisatsu. 
40  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 77–86. 
41  I am employing terms here used by Thomas Kasulis in his Shinto: The Way Home (2004) 
to point out that even the most ‘innocent’, apolitical postwar understandings of ‘existen- 
tial’ Shinto may contain traces of prewar ‘culturalist’ rhetoric. Kasulis himself notes that, 
in State Shinto terms, the emperor served as a kind of ‘holographic entry point’; for Koba- 
yashi, this role is played by Yasukuni Shrine as an embodiment of the ‘heroic spirits’. 
42 The Japan Conference was formed in 1997 with the merger of the Conference to 
Defend Japan, which includes veterans of the Imperial Army and Navy, and the Society 
to Defend Japan, a group aligned towards more specifically religious matters. The 
associated think tank for the Japan Conference is the Japan Policy Institute; see their 
website: www.nihonkaigi.org.jp. 
43  It is unclear whether Kobayashi’s mantra of ‘restoring’ Yasukuni implies a return to 
direct state sponsorship, i.e., State Shinto in the fuller sense. If so, he may not be as 
fringe as is often assumed. According to Hardacre: 
!
So eager is the [postwar] state to reappropriate Shintō symbolism in articulating a 
myth of cultural identity that it has supported several judicial decisions that seem to 
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move toward a reestablishment of the former alliance of Shintō and the state, even 
when a curtailment of individual religious liberties is involved. 
(Shinto and the State, 26–27) 
Hardacre wrote these words in the late 1980s; how much this still applies after the 
‘regime change’ of 2009 remains an open question. 
44 Much has been written about the appropriation of ‘victimhood’ in the context of 
postwar Japan, particularly in relation to the ‘collusion’ between postwar Japanese 
conservatives and SCAP Occupation authorities, each of whom had a vested interest in 
downplaying Japan’s military aggression and colonial expansionism in Asia prior to 
Pearl Harbor (see, e.g., Sakai, ‘Two Negations’, 163). I believe Kobayashi effectively 
taps into this rhetoric in Yasukuniron, by emphasising the postwar ‘violence’ done to 
the Yasukuni war dead by foreigners as well as the ‘internal other’. 
45  I have borrowed this term from Takahashi Tetsuya (‘Japanese Neo-nationalism’, 205). 
46  Griffin, Nature of Fascism, xi. 
47  Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 146. 
48  ‘Shikamo, sono ato, sono toki no inori to tomo ni sasageta nakai sae washi wa wasurete 
shimattairu no dakara . . .’ (Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, 158). 
49  See Naumann, ‘State Cult’, 54–55. 
50  The deification of Michizane was in fact a highly syncretistic affair, involving input 
from representatives of state ritual (‘Shinto’), folk religion, and institutional Buddhism. 
It should be emphasised that the deification of Michizane was primarily intended to 
pacify his angry ghost, and not to worship his person as such. The construction of 
shrines to worship the spirits of particular individuals – alive or dead – is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, one that emerged in the Edo Period, and then experienced a boom 
in the early Meiji Period (1868–1912) (see Katō Genchi, Honpō seishi; Boot, ‘Death of 
a Shogun’, 144). 
51  The notion of death as ‘pollution’ (kegare) – as one finds, for example, in the Kojiki – 
seems worlds away from Yasukuni theology, which is premised on death (for the 
emperor/state) as the highest act of nobility; indeed, as a virtual act of transcendence. 
And yet, even after the Restoration, Hirata School loyalists within the newly reconsti- 
tuted Jingikan were appalled by the Ōkuni faction’s support for ‘Shinto funerals’ (see 
Hardacre, Shinto and State, 36). 
52  Bocking, ‘Changing Images’, 177–178. Though Watarai Shinto is often considered a 
‘purely’ Shinto school, in fact, like all forms of ‘Shinto’ prior to the emergence of the 
Yoshida School in the sixteenth century, was deeply enmeshed with Buddhism (see, 
e.g., Kuroda, ‘Shinto in History’, 2). In fact, the idea of pilgrimage to Ise as a form of 
self-purification is rooted in the Tendai Buddhist teaching of hongaku or ‘original 
enlightenment’. 
53  See Hardacre, Shinto and State, 15–16. 
54  As K notes (Yasukuniron, 176), then Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō was roundly casti- 
gated for his assertion at a gathering of Shinto leaders on 15 May 2000 that Japan is ‘a 
land of kami’ (kami no kuni) – based, in K’s view, on a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the Japanese term kami, as well as a cultural differences in the concept of ‘public’ 
with respect to religion: ‘A religious outlook is the very foundation of [Japanese] soci- 
ety’s public spirit’ (shūkyōkan wa sono shakai no ‘kōkyōshin’ no kiso ni naru kara da). 
Of course, there is some truth to the first assertion, as the common English translation 
of kami as ‘God’ (or ‘gods’) is misleading, as was the widespread translation of Mori’s 
words in Western press as ‘Japan is a divine nation’. And yet, K fails to mention the 
other – and perhaps more controversial – part of Mori’s statement: ‘Japan is a land of 
kami, with the emperor as the center’ (Nihon wa tennō o chūshin to suru kami no kuni). 
55  K, always fond of finding instances of non-Japanese support for his positions, cites 
late-nineteenth-century Greek–Irish Japanist Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904) as the 
source for this particular phrase (Yasukuniron, 175). 
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56  Hirata, Zenshū, 267; quoted in Kamata, ‘Disfiguring’, 305, translation by Breen and 
Teeuwen. 
57  The exception is several panels on page 177, in which K ‘rebuts’ the misunderstanding 
about the emperor as a living ‘god’, and points out (fancifully; see Barrett, ‘Shinto and 
Taoism’) that the term tennō was deliberately chosen to make the Japanese emperor 
equivalent to the Chinese emperor, thus asserting Japan’s ‘independence’ from the 
Middle Kingdom. Of note here is K’s reference to the Kojiki and Nihonshoki as ‘fables’ 
(monogatari) that the Japanese people have the ‘magnanimity’ (doryō) to hold onto, 
depite their ‘marvelous’ (kisekiteki) character. This is another reflection of the 
modernist character of Kobayashi’s work. 
58  Of course, ‘empty’, as any East Asian Buddhist would know, need not imply powerless 
or ineffective (see Takashi, Splendid Monarchy, 24). 
59  While there is no question that ritual attention to spirits of the dead in Japan predates 
the Meiji period, it is a stretch to suggest, as K does on page 170, that it is the basis of 
ancient ‘Shinto’. Rather, ancestor veneration only became widespread throughout 
Japanese society ‘during the seventeenth century under Buddhist influence’ (Breen, 
‘Dead and Living’, 85). The idea, however, that ancestor veneration is the root of not 
only Japanese ‘religion’ but the very bedrock of Japanese ‘culture’ – understood as 
‘constitution’ or ‘way of life’ – is not uncommon; see Etō and Kobori, Yasukuni ronshū. 
60  See Breen, ‘Dead and Living’, for a full description of the layout of Yasukuni Shrine. 
61  See Breen, ‘Dead and Living’. 
62  See Murakami, Kokka Shintō, 216–222; also see the Jinja Honchō website: http:// 
www.jinjahoncho.or.jp/, accessed 12 July 2012. Thanks to John Breen for bringing to 
my attention the different portrayals of ‘Shinto’ on the English and Japanese versions 
of the website. 
63  See Nishikawa, ‘Two Interpretations’, 248. Also see Takahashi’s critique of Etō’s use 
of ‘culture’ (bunka) to mask Yasukuni’s political agenda (Yasukuni mondai, 173–178). 
64  See Kevin Doak’s argument with respect to a postwar continuation of ‘fascism unseen’ 
(‘Fascism Seen’, 33–34). 
!
!
References 
!
Addiss, Stephen, ed., Japanese Ghosts and Demons: Art of the Supernatural. New York: 
George Braziller, 1985. 
Antoni, Klaus, ‘Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion: The Problem of Vengeful Spirits’. 
Asian Folklore Studies (47, 1988): 123–136. 
Barrett, Tim, ‘Shinto and Taoism in Early Japan’, in J. Breen and M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto 
in History: Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 2000, 13–31. 
Bocking, Brian, ‘Changing Images of Shinto: Sanja Takusen or the Three Oracles’, in 
J. Breen and M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 
2000, 167–185. 
Boot, W.J., ‘The Death of a Shogun: Deification in Early Modern Japan’, in J. Breen and M. 
Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 2000, 144–166. 
Breen, John, ‘The Dead and the Living in the Land of Peace: A Sociology of the Yasukuni 
Shrine’, Mortality (9:1, 2004): 76–93. 
Clifford, Rebecca, ‘Cleansing History, Cleansing Japan: Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Analects 
of War and Japan’s Revisionist Revival’. Nissan Occasional Paper Series, no. 35, 2004, 
http://www.nissan.ox.ac.uk, accessed 12 July 2012. 
Doak, Kevin M., ‘Fascism Seen and Unseen: Fascism as a Problem in Cultural Representa- 
tion’, in A. Tansman, ed., The Culture of Japanese Fascism. Durham, NC and London: 
Duke University Press, 2009, 31–45. 
‘Land of kami, land of the dead’ 215 !
!
Etō, Jun and Kobori, Keiichiro, Yasukuni ronshū – Nihon no chinkon no dentō no tame ni 
[For the Sake of Japan’s Spirit Pacification Tradition: Collected Essays on Yasukuni]. 
Tokyo: Nihonkyō Bunsha, 1986. 
Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism. London: Pinter, 1991. 
Hardacre, Helen, Shintō and the State, 1868–1988. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1989. 
Hirata, Atsutane and Zenshū, Kankōkai, eds, Hirata Atsutane zenshū 1 & 2 [Complete 
Works of Hirata Atsutane, vols 1 & 2]. Tokyo: Meicho Shuppan, 1977. 
Iwasaki, Minoru and Richter, Steffi, ‘The Topology of Post-1990s Historical Revisionism’. 
Positions (16:3, 2008): 507–538. 
Kamata, Tōji, ‘The Disfiguring of Nativism: Hirata Atsutane and Orikuchi Shinobu’, in 
J. Breen and M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 
2000, 295–317. 
Kasulis, Thomas, Shinto: The Way Home. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004. 
Katō, Etsurō, Shin rinen manga no giho [Techniques for a New Manga]. Tokyo: Geijutsu 
Gakuin Shuppanbu, 1942. 
Katō,  Genchi,  Honpō  seishi  no  kenkyū:  Seishi  no  shijitsu  to  sono  shinri  bunseki 
[Research on Unsettled Spirits: A True History and Psychological Analysis of the 
Spirits]. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1931. 
Katō, Norihiro. Haisengo ron [After the Defeat]. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997. 
Kinsella, Sharon, Adult Manga: Culture and Power in Contemporary Japanese Society. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000. 
Kobayashi,  Yoshinori,  Shin  gōmanizumu  sengen  special:  Sensōron  [Neo-Gōmanism 
Manifesto Special: On War]. Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1998. 
———,  Shin  gōmanizumu  sengen  special:  Sensōron  (2)  [Neo-Gōmanism  Manifesto 
Special: On War, vol 2]. Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2001. 
———,  Shin  gōmanizumu  sengen  special:  Yasukuniron  [Neo-Gōmanism  Manifesto 
Special: On Yasukuni]. Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2005. 
Kuroda, Toshio, ‘Shinto in the History of Japanese Religion’, trans. J. C. Dobbins and 
S. Gay. Journal of Japanese Studies (7:1, 1981): 1–21. 
Matsumoto, Ken’ichi, Mikuriya, Takashi and Sakamoto, Kazuya, ‘War Responsibility and 
Yasukuni Shrine’, Japan Echo (32:5, 2005): 23–28. 
Murakami, Shigeyoshi, Kokka Shintō [State Shinto]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1970. 
———, Irei to shōkon: Yasukuni no shisō [Comforting Spirits and Invoking the Dead: The 
Ideology of Yasukuni]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974. 
Naumann, Nelly, ‘The State Cult of the Nara and Early Heian Periods’, in J. Breen and M. 
Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 2000, 47–67. 
Nelson, John, ‘Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military 
Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine’, Journal of Asian Studies (62:2, 2003): 445–467. 
Nishikawa, Nagao, ‘Two  Interpretations of  Japanese Culture’, trans. M.  Murata and 
G. McCormack, in D. Denoon, M. Hudson, G. McCormack and T. Morris-Suzuki, eds, 
Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern. London: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, 254–264. 
Nitta, Hitoshi, ‘Shinto as a “Non-religion”: The Origins and Development of an Idea’, 
J. Breen and M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 
2000, 252–271. 
Ōe, Shinobu, ‘Yasukuni Jinja [Yasukuni Shrine]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984. 
Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militariza- 
tion of Aesthetics in Japanee History. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
216James Mark Shields !
!
Powles, Cyril, ‘Yasukuni Jinja Hōan: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan’, 
Pacific Affairs (49:3, 1976): 491–505. 
Sakai, Naoki, ‘Two Negations: The Fear of Being Excluded and the Logic of Self-Esteem’, 
in R. F. Calichman, ed., Contemporary Japanese Thought. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005, 159–192. 
Schattschneider, Ellen, ‘The Work of Sacrifice in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: 
Bride Dolls and Ritual Appropriation at Yasukuni Shrine’, in A. Tansman, ed., The 
Culture of Japanese Fascism. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2009, 
297–317. 
Takahashi, Tetsuya, Yasukuni mondai [The Yasukuni Problem]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 
2005a. 
———, ‘Japanese Neo-Nationalism: A Critique of Katō Norihiro’s “After the Defeat” 
Discourse’, trans. R. Calichman, in R. Calichman, ed., Contemporary Japanese Thought. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2005b, 193–210. 
Takanaka, Akiko, ‘Architecture for Mass-Mobilization: The Chūreito Memorial 
Construction Movement, 1939–1945’, in A. Tansman, ed., The Culture of Japanese 
Fascism. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2009, 235–253. 
Takashi, Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1996. 
Tanaka, Nobumasa, Yasukuni no sengoshi [A Postwar History of Yasukuni]. Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 2002. 
Yamamoto, Nobuyoshi and Imano, Toshihiko, eds, Kindai kyōiku no tennōsei ideorogii 
[The Emperor System in Modern Education]. Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1973. 
